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Abstract: Evolutionary dynamics shape the living world around us. At the
center of every evolutionary process is a population of reproducing individ-
uals. The structure of that population aﬀects evolutionary dynamics. The
individuals can be molecules, cells, viruses, multi-cellular organisms or hu-
mans. Whenever the ﬁtness of individuals depends on the relative abundance
of phenotypes in the population, we are in the realm of evolutionary game
theory. Evolutionary game theory is a general approach that can describe the
competition of species in an ecosystem, the interaction between hosts and par-
asites, between viruses and cells, and also the spread of ideas and behaviors in
the human population. In this perspective we review recent advances in evo-
lutionary game dynamics with a particular emphasis on stochastic approaches
in ﬁnite sized and structured populations. We give simple, fundamental laws
that determine how natural selection choses between competing strategies. We
study the well-mixed population, evolutionary graph theory, games in pheno-
type space and evolutionary set theory. We apply these results to the evolution
of cooperation. The mechanism that leads to evolution of cooperation in these
settings could be called ‘spatial selection’: cooperators prevail against defectors
by clustering in physical or other spaces.
Keywords: evolutionary game theory, spatial games, evolutionary graph theory, games on
sets, evolution of cooperation, spatial selection
1. Introduction
An evolving population consists of reproducing individuals, which are information
carriers. When they reproduce, they pass on information. New mutants arise, if this
1process involves mistakes. Natural selection emerges if mutants reproduce at diﬀerent
rates and compete for limiting resources. The two most important media for carrying
forward the information of the evolutionary processes on Earth are biological polymers
(such as DNA and RNA) and human language. The ﬁrst gives rise to genetic evolution,
the second to cultural evolution. The mathematical approaches that we discuss below can
be interpreted within either of these two domains. There is also a non-linguistic cultural
evolution: we can imitate behavioral patterns without talking about them.
Evolution has become a discipline with a rich mathematical formalism. The mathe-
matical description of evolutionary processes is helpful for a rigorous understanding. We
do not see the mathematical approach to evolutionary dynamics as a metaphor, but as
describing biological reality. Life unfolds according to the mathematical laws of evolution.
Constant selection means the ﬁtness values of individuals are constant and do not
depend on the composition of the population. Frequency dependent selection means the
ﬁtness values depend on the relative abundances (=frequencies) of various types in the
population. Constant selection can be seen as a population adapting on a ﬁxed ﬁtness
landscape (Eigen & Schuster 1977, 1978), while frequency dependent selection implies
that the population changes the ﬁtness landscape as it moves over it (Nowak & Sigmund
2004).
Frequency dependent selection brings us into the world of evolutionary game the-
ory (Maynard Smith 1982, Hofbauer & Sigmund 1988) . Evolutionary game theory was
originally designed as a tool for studying animal behavior (Maynard Smith & Price 1973,
Houston & McNamara 1999) but has become a general approach that transcends almost
every aspect of evolutionary biology (Nowak & Sigmund 2004). Evolutionary game dy-
namics include the competition of species in an ecosystem (May 1973, May & Leonard
1975), the evolution of virulence in host-parasite interactions (Levin & Pimentel 1981,
May & Anderson 1983, Bonhoeﬀer & Nowak 1994, Nowak & May 1994), the interaction
between viruses and cells of the immune system (Nowak et al 1995, Nowak & May 2000),
the competition between phages for bacterial cells (Turner & Chao 1999), the evolution of
metabolic pathways (Pfeiﬀer et al 2001) and evolution of human language (Nowak et al
2002).
2The dynamical interactions in any group of humans with bonding, economic ex-
changes, learning from each other and exploration of new strategies represent evolutionary
games. Classical game theory was invented as a mathematical tool for studying eco-
nomic and strategic decisions of humans (von Neuman & Morgenstern 1944, Luce & Raiﬀa
1957, Fudenberg & Tirole 1991, Skyrms 1996, Binmore 2007, Osborne & Rubinstein 1994,
Samuelson 1997). Evolutionary game theory has added the concept of a population of
players and the idea that the payoﬀ is interpreted as ﬁtness. These two concepts naturally
lead to a dynamical approach (Maynard Smith 1982, Hofbauer & Sigmund 1988, 1998,
2003, Weibull 1995, McNamara et al 1999, Michod 1999, Gintis 2000, Cressman 2003,
Nowak 2006a).
The traditional framework of evolutionary game theory rests on diﬀerential equations,
which describe deterministic dynamics in well-mixed and inﬁnitely large populations. At
the center of this endeavor is the so-called ‘replicator equation’ (Taylor & Jonker 1978,
Hofbauer et al 1979, Zeeman 1980), where xi is the frequency and fi =
P
i aijxj is the
ﬁtness of strategy i. The coeﬃcients, aij, are the elements of the payoﬀ matrix. The
replicator equation is given by dxi/dt = xi(fi − ¯ f), where ¯ f the average ﬁtness of the
population. The replicator equation is linked to the concept of a Nash equilibrium (Nash
1950). If strategy i is a strict Nash equilibrium, which means that aii > aji for all j 6= i,
then it is an asymptotically stable ﬁxed point of the replicator equation (Hofbauer &
Sigmund 1988). A strict Nash equilibrium is similar to an evolutionarily stable strategy
(ESS).
Inﬁnitely large, well-mixed populations and deterministic dynamics are idealizations.
Real populations have a ﬁnite number of individuals and are not well-mixed. Typically it
is not the case that any two individuals interact equally likely. For example, the spatial
distribution of a population makes interactions among neighbors more likely than interac-
tions between distant individuals. The social network in human populations cause friends
to interact more often than strangers. These realizations led to spatial approaches for evo-
lutionary game dynamics (Nowak & May 1992, 1993, Ellison 1993, Herz 1994, Lindgren
& Nordahl 1994, Ferriere & Michod 1996, Killingback & Doebeli 1996, Nakamaru et al
1997, 1998, Szabo & Toeke 1998, van Baalen & Rand 1998, Hofbauer 1999, Szabo et al
32000, Hutson & Vickers 2002, Kerr et al 2002, Hauert & Doebeli 2004, Nakamaru & Iwasa
2005, Yamamura et al 2004, Helbing & Wu 2008) and later to evolutionary graph theory
(Lieberman et al 2005, Ohtsuki et al 2006, Ohtsuki & Nowak 2006ab). Spatial models have
a long tradition in ecology (Levin & Paine 1974, Durrett & Levin 1994ab, Hassell et al
1994, Tilman & Kareiva 1997), and they have also been analyzed with methods of inclusive
ﬁtness theory (Hamilton 1964, Seger 1981, Grafen 1985, 2006, Taylor 1992, Taylor & Irwin
2000, Rousset & Biliard 2000, Rousset 2004).
Evolutionary dynamics in ﬁnite sized populations are not deterministic but stochastic.
If two mutants have exactly the same ﬁtness, eventually one of them will take over, while
the other becomes extinct. An advantageous mutant has a certain probability to win, but
no certainty. Sometimes deleterious mutants can prevail, thereby allowing the evolutionary
process to cross ﬁtness valleys.
These considerations bring us to some of the great open questions in the ﬁeld. How
can we formulate stochastic evolutionary (game) dynamics in populations of ﬁnite size?
How does natural selection choose between strategies in structured populations? What
does evolutionary stability mean in structured populations and in the presence of random
drift? What is a general description of population structure? For some of those questions
we suggest answers in this article.
We apply the results presented in this paper to the evolution of cooperation, which
is a fascinating topic in evolutionary biology (Trivers 1971, Axelrod & Hamilton 1981,
Milinski 1987, May 1987, Nowak & Sigmund 1990, 2005, Doebeli & Knowlton 1998, Frank
1998, Bshary et al 2008). How does natural selection lead to situations where competing
individuals help each other? Cooperation is important because it allows construction.
Without cooperation there is no tendency in evolution to lead to ever increasing complexity.
New levels of organization emerge, because competing entities learn to cooperate. For that
reason, one can argue that cooperation is a third fundamental principle of evolution, next
to mutation and selection (Nowak 2006b).
This article is arranged as follows. In Section 2 we discuss strategy selection in well-
mixed populations. In Section 3 we present the concept of ‘structural dominance’ and
introduce the structure coeﬃcient, σ. In Section 4 we discuss evolutionary graph theory.
4In Section 5 we study ‘games in phenotype space’. In Section 6 we discuss evolutionary
set theory. In Section 7 we apply the results of the previous sections to the evolution of
cooperation. Section 8 oﬀers a conclusion.
2. Evolutionary games in well mixed populations
In a well-mixed population any two individuals interact equally likely. The well-
mixed population is the reference point for any analysis of how population structure aﬀects
evolution. Therefore, we begin by studying strategy selection in the well-mixed population.
For all subsequent models the well mixed population always represents a special case. For
example, in evolutionary graph theory the well-mixed population is given by a complete
graph with identical weights. In evolutionary set theory the well-mixed population is
obtained if all individuals are in the same set.
2.1 Two strategies
Consider a game between two strategies, A and B. If two A players interact, both get
payoﬀ a; if A interacts with B, then A gets b and B gets c; if two B players interact, both
get d. These interactions are represented by the payoﬀ matrix


A B
A a b
B c d

 (1)
We consider a population of size N. There are i many A individuals and N−i many B
individuals. The variable, i, ranges from 0 to N. For an A individual there are i−1 other
A individuals. For a B individual there are N − i − 1 other B individuals. Therefore, the
expected payoﬀs are FA = [a(i−1)+b(N−i)]/(N−1) and FB = [ci+d(N−i−1)]/(N−1).
Payoﬀ translates into reproductive success. Here we assume that ﬁtness is a linear
function of payoﬀ: fA = 1 + wFA and fB = 1 + wFB. The constant, 1, represents the
‘background ﬁtness’ which is independent of the game. The parameter w denotes intensity
of selection; it quantiﬁes how strongly the particular game under consideration aﬀects
the ﬁtness of individuals. The limit w → 0 represents weak selection. Many analytical
5insights can be derived for this limit, because weak selection tends to linearize the involved
functions (Nowak et al 2004, Taylor et al 2004, Tarnita et al 2009a).
For each updating step, we pick one individual for death at random and one individual
for birth proportional to ﬁtness. The oﬀspring of the second individual replaces the ﬁrst.
Hence, the total population size is strictly constant. This stochastic process was introduced
by Moran (1958) for the study of constant selection. We can also interpret the individual
update steps as learning events. At random an individual decides to update its strategy.
He picks a ‘teacher’ from the population proportional to ﬁtness and tries to imitate her
strategy. Let us now add mutation. With probability 1 − u the strategy of the parent (or
teacher) is adopted, but with probability u one of the two strategies (A or B) is chosen at
random. The mutation rate u is a parameter between 0 and 1.
We ﬁnd that A more abundant than B in the stationary distribution of the mutation-
selection process if
(N − 2)a + Nb > Nc + (N − 2)d. (2)
This condition was ﬁrst derived by Kandori et al (1993) for low mutation in an evolu-
tionary process that is deterministic in following the gradient of selection. Nowak et al
(2004) obtained this result for a stochastic selection process by comparing the two ﬁxation
probabilities, ρA and ρB, in the limit of weak selection. Antal et al (2009a) showed that
condition (2) holds for a large variety of stochastic mutation-selection processes for any
intensity of selection and any mutation rate.
For large population size, N, we obtain a+b > c+d, which is the well known condition
for risk dominance in a coordination game (Harsanyi & Selten 1988). A coordination game
is deﬁned by a > c and b < d. In this case, both A and B are Nash equilibria. The risk
dominant equilibrium has the bigger basin of attraction. The Pareto eﬃcient equilibrium
has the higher payoﬀ. For example, if a + b > c + d then A is risk-dominant, but if a < d
then B is Pareto eﬃcient. It is often interesting to ask, when Pareto eﬃciency is chosen
over risk dominance.
2.2 Two or more strategies
Let us now consider a game with n strategies. The payoﬀ values are given by the n×n
6payoﬀ matrix A = [aij]. This means that an individual using strategy i receives payoﬀ aij
when interacting with an individual that uses strategy j.
We consider the same evolutionary process as before. Mutation means: with probabil-
ity u one of the n strategies is chosen at random. Let us introduce the parameter µ = Nu,
which is the rate at which the entire population produces mutants. We say that selection
favors strategy k, if the average abundance of k is greater than 1/n, in the stationary
distribution of the mutation-selection process. The following results were derived by Antal
et al (2009b) and hold for weak selection and large population size.
For low mutation, µ → 0, the population almost always consists of only a single
strategy. This strategy is challenged by one invading strategy at a time. The invader
becomes extinct or takes over the population. Thus, the crucial quantities are the ‘pairwise
dominance measures’, aii +aij −aji −ajj. It turns out that selection favors strategy k, if
the average over all pairwise dominance measures is positive:
Lk =
1
n
n X
i=1
(akk + aki − aik − aii) > 0. (3)
For high mutation, µ → ∞, the population contains each strategy at roughly the same
frequency, 1/n, at any time. The average payoﬀ of strategy k is ¯ ak =
P
j akj/n, while the
average payoﬀ of all strategies is ¯ a =
P
j ¯ aj/n. Strategy k is favored by selection, if its
average payoﬀ exceeds that of the population, ¯ ak > ¯ a. This condition can be written as
Hk =
1
n2
n X
i=1
n X
j=1
(akj − aij) > 0. (4)
We note that this condition holds for large mutation rate and any intensity of selection.
Amazingly, for any mutation rate, strategy k is favored by selection, if a simple linear
combination of (3) and (4) holds:
Lk + µHk > 0. (5)
Moreover, in the stationary distribution, k is more abundant than j if
Lk + µHk > Lj + µHj. (6)
7Eqs (5) and (6) are useful conditions that quantify strategy selection for n×n games
in well-mixed populations. They hold for weak selection, large population size, but any
mutation rate. Eqs (3-6) can also be generalized to continuous strategy spaces and mixed
strategies (Tarnita et al, 2009c).
3. Structural dominance
Before we turn to speciﬁc approaches for exploring population structure, we present
a general result that holds for almost any processes of evolutionary game dynamics in well
mixed or structured populations. Consider two strategies, A and B, and the payoﬀ matrix
(1). Tarnita et al (2009a) show that for weak selection, the condition that A is more
abundant than B in the stationary distribution of the mutation-selection process can be
written as
σa + b > c + σd. (7)
Hence, the crucial condition specifying which strategy is more abundant is a linear inequal-
ity in the payoﬀ values, a,b,c,d. The structure coeﬃcient, σ, can depend on the population
structure, the update rule, the population size and the mutation rate, but does not depend
on a,b,c,d. Therefore, the eﬀect of population structure can be summarized by a single
parameter, σ, if we are only interested in the question which of the two strategies, A or B,
is more abundant in the stationary distribution of the mutation-selection process in the
limit of weak selection.
For a large well-mixed population we have σ = 1; see Section 2.1. But in structured
populations we can obtain σ > 1. In this case, the diagonal entries of the payoﬀ matrix are
more important than the the oﬀ-diagonal entries for determining strategy selection. This
property allows to select Pareto eﬃciency over risk dominance in coordination games. It
also allows the evolution of cooperation as we will see in Section 7.
In the subsequent Sections, the crucial results will be expressed as σ-values. These σ-
values quantify how natural selection chooses between competing strategies for particular
population structures and update rules.
4. Spatial games and evolutionary graph theory
8In the traditional setting of spatial games the individuals of a population are arranged
on a regular lattice, and interactions occur among nearest neighbors (Nowak & May 1992).
In evolutionary graph theory, the individuals occupy the vertices of a graph, and the edges
denote who interacts with whom (Lieberman et al 2005, Ohtsuki et al 2006, Ohtsuki
& Nowak 2006ab, Pacheco et al 2006, Lehman et al 2007, Szabo & Fath 2007, Taylor
et al 2007ab, Santos et al 2008, Fu et al 2008). Spatial games are a special case of
evolutionary graph theory. Also the well-mixed population simply corresponds to the
special case of a complete graph with identical weights. Note that the interaction graph
and the replacement graph need not be identical (Ohtsuki et al 2007), but we do not
discuss this extension in the present paper.
Evolutionary dynamics on graphs depend on the update rule. Many diﬀerent update
rules can be considered, but here we limit ourselves to ‘death-birth’ (DB) updating: one
individual is chosen at random to die; the neighbors compete for the empty site propor-
tional to ﬁtness. This update rule can also be interpreted in terms of social learning: a
random individual decides to update his strategy; then he chooses among his neighbors’
strategies proportional to ﬁtness. All results of this section (unless otherwise stated) hold
for the limit of weak selection and low mutation.
4.1 Structural dominance for two strategies
At ﬁrst we consider games between two strategies, A and B, given by the payoﬀ matrix
(1). Each individual interacts with all of its neighbors and thereby accumulates a payoﬀ
(Fig 1). Individual i has payoﬀ Fi and ﬁtness fi = 1+wFi, where again w is the intensity
of selection. The limit of weak selection is given by w → 0.
For regular graphs we can calculate the σ parameter. A graph is regular if all in-
dividuals have the same number, k, of connections. This number is called the degree of
the graph. The family of regular graphs includes many spatial lattices and also random
regular graphs. For large population size, N  k, Ohtsuki et al (2006) ﬁnd
σ = (k + 1)/(k − 1) (8)
For general heterogeneous graphs such as Erdos-Renyi random graphs or scale-free
networks we do not have analytical results. Computer simulations suggest that in some
9cases the results of regular graphs carry over, but k is replaced by the average degree ¯ k.
Thus, there is some indication that σ = (¯ k +1)/(¯ k −1). This result seems to hold as long
as the variance of the degree distribution is not too large (Ohtsuki et al 2006).
For one particular heterogeneous graph we have an exact result. The star is a structure
where one individual is in the hub and N − 1 individuals populate the periphery. The
average degree is ¯ k = 2(N −1)/N, but the variance is large; hence, we do not expect eq (8)
to hold. Tarnita et al (2009a) show that σ = 1 for DB updating on a star for all population
sizes, N ≥ 3, and any mutation rate.
4.2 The replicator equation on graphs and evolutionary stability
The deterministic dynamics of the average frequencies of strategies on regular graphs
can be described by a diﬀerential equation (Ohtsuki & Nowak 2006b). This equation has
the structure of a replicator equation, but the graph induces a transformation of the payoﬀ
matrix. The replicator equation on graphs is of the form
˙ xi = xi
 n X
j=1
xj(aij + bij) − ¯ f

. (9)
Here xi denotes the relative abundance (=frequency) of strategy i. There are n strategies.
The payoﬀs are given by the n×n matrix A = [aij]. The parameter ¯ f denotes the average
ﬁtness of the population as in the standard replicator equation. The B = [bij] matrix is
anti-symmetric and captures the essence of local competition on a graph, where it matters
how much strategy i gets from i and from j and how little j gets from i and from j. For
DB updating we have
bij =
(k + 1)aii + aij − aji − (k + 1)ajj
(k + 1)(k − 2)
(10)
An immediate consequence of the replicator equation on graphs is a concept of evolu-
tionarily stable strategies (ESS) in graph structured populations (Ohtsuki & Nowak 2008).
A strategy is evolutionarily stable if it can resist invasion by inﬁnitesimal small fractions of
other strategies (Maynard Smith 1982). Let us use eqs (9) and (10) for a game between two
strategies A and B given by the payoﬀ matrix (1). We obtain the following ESS condition
(k2 − 1)a + b > (k2 − k − 1)c + (k + 1)d (11)
10This condition has a beautiful geometric interpretation . For evolutionary stability, we
ask if a homogeneous population of A individuals can resist the invasion by a small fraction
of B individuals. Because of weak selection the ﬁtness of the invaders is roughly the same
as that of the residents. Therefore, in the beginning about half of all invaders die out while
the other half reproduce. Weak selection leads to a separation of two time scales: (i) on a
fast time scale there is a local equilibration, leading to an ‘invasion cluster’; (ii) on a slow
time scale the frequency of the invaders changes (either up or down). The invasion cluster
has geometric properties which determine the ESS conditions. The essential property is the
following: a random ensemble of neighbors around one B individual contains on average
one B individual. Hence, the invasion cluster forms a half-line of B individuals. The ESS
condition speciﬁes that the tip of the half-line shrinks.
4.3 Structural dominance for n strategies on graphs
The replicator equation on graphs suggests an extension of the concept of structural
dominance (of Section 3) to games with n strategies for low mutation. If we use the
modiﬁed payoﬀ matrix, A + B, for eq (4) we obtain
n X
j=1
σaii + aij − aji − σajj > 0. (12)
Here σ = (k + 1)/(k − 1) as it should be. We will show in a forthcoming paper that such
a condition holds for games with n strategies for a wide variety of population structures
and update rules (for low mutation and weak selection).
5. Games in phenotype space
Typically, individuals express other phenotypic properties in addition to their be-
havioral strategies. These phenotypic properties can include size, hight, other aspects of
physical appearance or other behaviors. Let us consider a situation where the behavioral
strategies are conditional on these other phenotypic properties. A particular setting was
studied by Antal et al (2009c): there are two strategies, A and B, and the standard payoﬀ
matrix (1); the phenotype is given by one (or several) continuous or discrete variables.
Individuals only interact with others who have the same phenotype. Reproduction is
11proportional to ﬁtness. Oﬀspring inherit the strategy and the phenotype of their parent
subject to mutation. The population drifts in phenotype space. Occasionally the popula-
tion splits into two or several clusters, but in the long run the population remains localized
in phenotype space, because of sampling eﬀects that occur in ﬁnite populations.
Antal et al (2009c) develop a general theory that is based on calculating the coalescent
probabilities among individuals. They also perform speciﬁc calculations for a one dimen-
sional phenotype space (Fig 2). The phenotypic mutation rate is v. If the phenotype of the
parent is given by the integer i, then the phenotype of the oﬀspring is given by i−1,i,i+1
with probabilities v,1 − 2v,v, respectively. For weak selection, A is more abundant than
B if a σ-type condition (7) holds. For large population size and low strategy mutation the
structural coeﬃcient is given by
σ =
1 + 4ν
2 + 4ν

1 +
r
3 + 12ν
3 + 4ν

. (13)
Here ν = 2Nv where N is population size. Note that σ is an increasing function of ν. For
large ν we have σ → 1 +
√
3.
When applied to the evolution of cooperation, games in phenotype space are related
to models for tag based cooperation (Riolo et al 2001, Traulsen & Claussen 2004, Jansen
& van Baalen 2006, Traulsen & Nowak 2007) or ‘Green beard eﬀects’. The model of Antal
et al (2009c) is the simplest model of tag based cooperation that leads to evolution of
cooperation without any additional assumptions such as physical spatial structure.
6. Evolutionary set theory
The geometry of human populations is determined by the associations that individuals
have with various groups or sets. We participate in activities or belong to institutions
where we interact with other people. Each person belongs to several sets. Such sets
can be deﬁned, for example, by working for a particular company or living in a speciﬁc
location. There can be sets within sets. For example, the students of the same university
study diﬀerent subjects and take diﬀerent classes. These set memberships determine the
structure of human society: they specify who meets whom, and they deﬁne the frequency
and context of meetings between individuals.
12Tarnita et al (2009b) proposed a framework of population structure called ‘evolution-
ary set theory’ (Fig 3). A population of N individuals is distributed over M sets. Each
individual belongs to exactly K sets. Interactions occur within a given set. If two people
have several sets in common they interact several times. Interaction between individuals
leads to a payoﬀ from an evolutionary game. Let us consider a game between two strategies
A and B given by payoﬀ matrix (1).
Both the strategy and the set memberships are subject to evolutionary updating.
Successful individuals are imitated with respect to their behavior and their set associations.
Hence, successful strategies spread and successful sets attract more members. There is a
strategy mutation rate and a set mutation rate. The set mutation leads people to explore
new sets independent of imitation events. There is migration between sets both because of
imitation of other people and because of set mutation. The stochastic mutation-selection
process generates a stationary distribution of the population over sets and strategies.
For weak selection, A is more abundant than B if a σ-type inequality (7) holds.
Tarnita et al (2009b) calculate the exact σ, which depends on the population size, N, the
number of sets, M, the number of set memberships, K, the set mutation rate, v, and the
strategy mutation rate, u. A simple expression is obtained if we assume large population
size and low strategy mutation rate:
σ =
M(2ν + 3) + Kν(ν + 2)
M + Kν(ν + 2)
·
ν + 1
ν + 3
(14)
Here we use the combined parameter ν = 2Nv. For ν  1 we obtain the approximation
σ ≈ (2Mν + Kν2)/(M + Kν2).
The parameter σ is an increasing function of M and a one-humped function of ν. If
ν is too small then the entire population clumps in the same sets. If ν is too large then
the membership of individual sets does not persist long enough in time. In both cases
the population is essentially ‘well-mixed’ (which means σ → 1). There is an intermediate
optimum value of ν which is approximately given by
p
M/K. For this value of ν we obtain
the maximum value of σ, which is also close to
p
M/K. Larger values of σ are obtained if
there are many sets, M, and each person can only be in very few of them. The minimum
number of set memberships is K = 1.
13In an extension of the model, individuals interact with others only if they have at
least L sets in common (Tarnita et al 2009b). More speciﬁcally, two individuals interact
i times if they have i ≥ L sets in common; otherwise they do not interact at all. In this
case the same equations apply as before but K is replaced by K∗ which is given by
K∗ = K
K X
i=L

K − 1
i − 1

M − K
K − i

/

M − 1
K − 1

. (15)
Note that K∗ can be less than one. Now it is no longer the case that the maximum σ is
obtained for K = 1. Instead for a given M the maximum σ is obtained for L = K = M/2,
which maximizes the combinatorial possibilities of social identities.
7. Evolution of cooperation by ‘spatial selection’
We can now use the results of the previous sections to study how population structure
aﬀects the evolution of cooperation. The most diﬃcult setting for evolution of cooperation
is given by the Prisoner’s Dilemma. Aspects of cooperation can also be found in other
games, but they represent somewhat relaxed situations. In this Section, we focus on the
Prisoner’s Dilemma.
7.1 The Prisoner’s Dilemma
The Prisoner’s Dilemma is a game with two strategies, cooperation, C, and defection,
D. If two cooperators meet they get payoﬀ, R. If two defectors meet they get a lower
payoﬀ, P. But if a cooperator meets a defector, the defector gets the highest payoﬀ, T,
while the cooperator gets the lowest payoﬀ, S. We have T > R > P > S. The payoﬀ
matrix is given by


C D
C R S
D T P

 (16)
In a well mixed population cooperators are less abundant than defectors in the sta-
tionary distribution of the mutation-selection process, because R + S < T + P. But in a
structured population with σ > 1 this situation can be reversed: if σ > (T−S)/(R−P) > 1
then cooperators are more abundant than defectors in the stationary distribution for weak
14selection. The σ values of Sections 4 - 6 provide the exact conditions for evolution of
cooperation in the respective models. The larger the value of σ the broader is the pa-
rameter range that is still compatible with evolution of cooperation. For DB updating on
regular graphs the largest σ value is given for the cycle, where σ = 3. This means DB
updating on regular graphs can support cooperation as long as 3 > (T − S)/(R − P) > 1.
For games in a one-dimensional phenotype space, cooperation is possible for 1 +
√
3 >
(T − S)/(R − P) > 1. For evolutionary set theory, using the optimum set mutation rate,
we ﬁnd
p
M/K∗ > (T − S)/(R − P) > 1. Here M is the number of sets and K∗ is an ef-
fective number of set memberships as given by eq (15). Therefore, evolutionary set theory
can lead to unbounded values of σ.
Using the replicator equation on graphs (9,10) for payoﬀ matrix (16) shows that all
four dynamical scenarios are possible depending on parameter choices: (i) cooperators
dominate defectors; (ii) cooperators and defectors coexist; (iii) cooperators and defectors
are bistable; or (iv) defectors dominate cooperators (Taylor & Nowak 2007). In particular,
cooperators are evolutionarily stable against invasion by defectors if (T − R − P + S) +
(T − P)k − (T − R)k2 > 0.
7.2 Costs and beneﬁts - the simpliﬁed game
A simpliﬁed Prisoner’s Dilemma is obtained if cooperators pay a cost, c, for others
to receive a beneﬁt, b, while defectors pay no costs and distribute no beneﬁts. The payoﬀ
matrix is given by


C D
C b − c −c
D b 0

 (17)
The game is a Prisoner’s Dilemma if b > c > 0. Using the σ-factors of Sections 4 to 6 we
obtain the following conditions for the evolution of cooperation under weak selection:
- For DB updating on graphs we have (Ohtsuki et al 2006)
b/c > k (18)
15- For games in a one dimensional phenotype space we have (Antal et al 2008c)
b/c >
(1 + 4ν)3/2 + (3 + 8ν)
p
1 + 4ν/3
(1 + 4ν)3/2 −
p
1 + 4ν/3
(19)
The critical beneﬁt-to-cost ratio is a declining function of the phenotypic mutation rate,
ν. For large values of ν it converges to the simple expression b/c > 1 + 2/
√
3.
- For evolutionary set theory we have (Tarnita et al 2009b)
b/c >
K∗
M − K∗(ν + 2) +
M
M − K∗
ν2 + 3ν + 3
ν(ν + 2)
(20)
The critical beneﬁt-to-cost ratio is a declining function of the ratio M/K∗. Moreover, it is
a U-shaped function of the set mutation rate, ν. For the optimum value of the set mutation
rate (and M  K∗) we obtain b/c > 1 + 2
p
K∗/M.
The relationship between the critical beneﬁt-to-cost ratio, (b/c)∗, and the structure
coeﬃcient, σ, is given by (b/c)∗ = (σ + 1)/(σ − 1). For calculating σ it is enough to
know (b/c)∗ or vice versa (Tarnita et al 2009a). Hence, if we only want to know which
of the two strategies is more abundant in the stationary distribution for weak selection,
it is enough to consider the simpliﬁed payoﬀ matrix (20) and from there we can calculate
σ. But for a general analysis of evolutionary game dynamics it is of course not enough to
study the simpliﬁed matrix. For example, using the replicator equation on graphs we ﬁnd
that cooperators dominate defectors for b/c > k, while defectors dominate cooperators
for b/c < k. Hence, only two of the four dynamical scenarios can occur, while all four
dynamical scenarios are possible for the general Prisoner’s Dilemma (see 7.1).
7.3 Spatial selection is distinct from group selection and kin selection
The mechanism for the evolution of cooperation (Nowak 2006) that is operating in all
models that we have discussed here could be called ‘spatial selection’. Cooperators prevail
because they can form clusters, either in physical space, on networks, in phenotype space
or in sets. Individuals within such clusters gain a higher payoﬀ than defectors that try
to invade them. ‘Spatial selection’ can favor cooperation if the structure coeﬃcient, σ,
exceeds one.
16Spatial selection is a diﬀerent mechanism than group selection (Wynne-Edwards 1962,
Wilson 1975, 1983, Wade 1977, 1978 Uyenoyama 1979, Leigh 1983, Szathmary & Demeter
1987, Goodnight 1990a,b, Goodnight & Stevens 1997, Boyd & Richerson 2002, Kerr &
Godfrey-Smith 2002, Paulsson 2002, Fletcher & Zwick 2004, Wilson & Hoelldobler 2005,
Killingback et al 2006, Traulsen & Nowak 2006, Reeve & Hoelldobler 2007, Traulsen et
al 2008). For group selection we have competition on two diﬀerent levels: individuals
compete within groups and groups compete with each other. For spatial selection there is
only clustering of individuals and no second level of selection. Consequently the underly-
ing mathematical theories are diﬀerent, although the structural dominance condition (7)
applies in both cases (Tarnita et al 2009a).
Kin selection can arise if evolutionary games occur between genetical relatives. It is
a mechanism for the evolution of cooperation if there is conditional behavior based on kin
recognition. For example, Haldane would jump into the river to save two brothers or eight
cousins. In such a setting it is clear that kin selection is diﬀerent from group selection
and diﬀerent from spatial selection. Furthermore, the latter mechanisms can also operate
in the context of cultural evolution where successful strategies spread by imitation and
learning in the absence of any genetic reproduction.
The mathematical methods of inclusive ﬁtness theory have led to interesting results
over the years (Taylor 1992ab, Taylor et al 2000, Rousset 2004, Taylor et al 2007ab) and
provide a useful complementation to other approaches. But some authors claim that kin
selection is a universal mechanism for the evolution of cooperation (Lehmann & Keller
2006, West et al 2007). Central to this claim is the idea that Hamilton’s rule is always
true. Hamilton’s rule states that cooperation is favored over defection if b/c > 1/r where
r is ‘relatedness’. We think that this universality claim of kin selection theory is wrong for
the following reasons:
(i) The general problem of evolution of cooperation cannot be described by a model
that only works with costs and beneﬁts. The simpliﬁed payoﬀ matrix (17) represents only a
special case of the general matrix (16). Moreover aspects of cooperation can also be found
in other games. Any theory that claims universality must deal with general evolutionary
games.
17(ii) Kin selection theory is always formulated using a special form of weak selection.
A theory that claims universality should be able to make statements about any intensity of
selection. (Many of the results presented in this paper are also derived for weak selection,
but we do not make meaningless universality claims and we do appreciate the diﬀerence
between knowing something for weak selection and knowing something in general.)
(iii) ‘Relatedness’ is a ﬂexible concept within kin selection theory. It always needs to
be modiﬁed when a new model is encountered. So far inclusive ﬁtness theorists only know
how to deﬁne ‘relatedness’ for a very small subset of possible models. Already for simple
models the necessary deﬁnition of ‘relatedness’ is very diﬀerent from any empirical concept
of pedigree relatedness.
(iv) The claim that ‘relatedness’ is the fundamental reason for all evolution of coop-
eration is a mistake of cause and eﬀect. All mechanisms for the evolution of cooperation
can be seen as leading to assortment of cooperation and defection, but assortment itself
is not a mechanism. It is the consequence of a mechanism. The key question is always
how assortment is achieved. The dogmatic insistence on ‘relatedness’ obscures a useful
discussion of ‘mechanism’.
For other criticism of the universality claim of kin selection see Wilson (2005, 2008),
Wilson & H¨ olldobler (2005), Fletcher et al (2006), Wild & Traulsen (2007), Fletcher &
Doebeli (2009), van Veelen (2009).
8. Discussion
At the center of every evolutionary process is a population of reproducing individuals.
The structure of that population aﬀects evolutionary dynamics. In a well-mixed population
natural selection could favor one strategy, but in a structured population another strategy
might win. Changing the underlying population structure can reverse the outcome of an
evolutionary process (Nowak & May 1992).
We began by showing some results for stochastic evolutionary game dynamics in well-
mixed populations of ﬁnite size. Inequalities (3-6) specify which strategies are more abun-
dant in the equilibrium distribution of the mutation-selection process. They can be used
for any n×n payoﬀ matrix, and they provide an immediate answer to the question of which
18strategy is favored in the limit of weak selection. These conditions can be more informa-
tive than the traditional Nash or ESS conditions, if we want to understand evolutionary
dynamics in ﬁnite populations.
Next we introduced the concept of ‘structural dominance’ (Tarnita et al 2009a). For
almost any evolutionary process in a structured population, strategy A is favored over B if
σa+b > c+σd. Here a,b,c,d are the entries of the payoﬀ matrix (1) and σ is the ‘structure
coeﬃcient’. For a large well-mixed population, we have σ = 1, which reduces structural
dominance to the well known concept of risk dominance, a + b > c + d. But for many
population structures and update rules the structure coeﬃcient can deviate from one. If
σ > 1 then the diagonal entries of the payoﬀ matrix are emphasized over the oﬀ-diagonal
entries. This means that the population structure leads to a clustering of strategies, where
individuals who have the same strategy are more likely to interact (Nowak & May 1992).
This positive assortment of strategies, however, does not always occur; for some population
structures and update rules, we obtain σ = 1 as if the population was well-mixed. For
example, birth-death updating on any regular graph leads to σ = 1 (Ohtsuki et al 2006),
while death-birth updating on a star leads to σ = 1 for any mutation rate.
There is (as yet) no general mathematical framework that would encompass evolu-
tionary dynamics for any kind of population structure. We have discussed three diﬀerent
approaches: evolutionary graph theory, games in phenotype space and evolutionary set
theory.
In evolutionary graph theory the individuals of a population occupy the vertices of a
graph, and the edges determine who interacts with whom. Evolutionary graph theory is
a generalization of earlier models of spatial games to arbitrary population structure. This
extension seems to be useful for studying human populations, where the social network
determines patterns of interaction. The graph is usually ﬁxed on the time scale of evolu-
tionary updating, which is an important limitation of the existing theory, although some
models with dynamical graphs have been proposed (Pacheco et al 2006). For evolutionary
dynamics on ﬁxed, regular graphs we can calculate the structure coeﬃcient for various
update rules. We can derive a replicator equation on graphs (Ohtsuki & Nowak 2006),
discuss evolutionary stability (Ohtsuki & Nowak 2008) and calculate ﬁxation probabilities
19(Ohtsuki et al 2006). There can also be diﬀerent graphs for interaction and replacement
(Ohtsuki et al 2007).
For ‘games in phenotype space’ we have explored the idea that the strategic behavior is
dependent on other phenotypic properties. We observe clustering of strategies in phenotype
space. The population structure aﬀects strategic behavior, but evolutionary updating
occurs as for a well mixed population. We call this approach ‘global updating’. This is
the key diﬀerence between games in phenotype space and evolutionary graph theory as
presented here.
The structure of human society can be described by set memberships. We belong
to many sets and are more likely to interact with those who are in the same sets. In
evolutionary set theory the individuals of the population are distributed over sets. Each
individual can belong to several sets. Individuals interact with others in the same set.Two
people can have more than one set in common. The evolutionary updating includes both
strategy and set memberships. Successful strategies breed imitators, successful sets attract
more members. Evolutionary set theory oﬀers a particular approach for a dynamical graph
theory. At any one time the structure of the population can be described by a graph, but
this graph changes under evolutionary updating.
Many of our results hold only for weak selection: the payoﬀ that is earned in the game
makes a small contribution to the total ﬁtness of an individual. We think that such an
assumption is useful for human interactions. It is rarely the case that all our stakes are
in one game. Therefore, our social instincts might well be adapted to situations of weak
selection. But is an important goal to derive simple results that hold for any intensity of
selection. Some success in this direction has already been achieved (Traulsen et al 2008,
Antal et al 2009a).
We hope that the structural frameworks presented here will turn out to be useful for
studying social evolutionary dynamics of humans. Every day we learn from each other and
adjust our strategies. We are embedded in social structures that determine the frequency
and context of interactions. We compete with others and have to ﬁnd ways to cooperate.
Our results have implications for the evolution of cooperation. Evolutionary dynamics
on graphs, in sets and in phenotype space can favor cooperators, because they cluster in
20physical or other spaces.
When discussing human behavior, let us keep in mind that we are never outside of the
frameworks of direct or indirect reciprocity. Our actions tend to be conditional on previous
experience. Direct reciprocity occurs when my behavior towards you depend on what you
have done to me. Indirect reciprocity means my behavior towards you also depends on
what you have done to others. Eventually direct and indirect reciprocity must be combined
with the frameworks that are presented here in order to obtain a complete mathematical
theory of social evolutionary dynamics of humans.
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28Figure legends
Figure 1: In evolutionary graph theory, the individuals of a population occupy the ver-
tices of a graph. The edged denote who interacts with whom - both for accumulating
payoﬀ and for reproductive competition. Here we consider two strategies, A (blue) and B
(red). Evolutionary dynamics on graphs depend on the update rule. In this paper we use
death-birth updating: a random individual dies; the neighbors compete for the empty site
proportional to ﬁtness.
Figure 2: We study games in a one-dimensional, discrete phenotype space. The phenotype
of an individual is given by an integer i. The oﬀspring of this individual has phenotype
i−1,i,i+1 with probabilities v,1−2v,v, where v is the phenotypic mutation rate. Oﬀspring
also inherit the strategy of their parent (red or blue) with a certain mutation rate. Each
individual interacts with others who have the same phenotype and thereby derives a payoﬀ.
The population drifts through phenotype space. Strategies tend to cluster. For evolution
of cooperation this model represents a very simple scenario of tag-based cooperation (or
‘Green beard’ eﬀects).
Figure 3: In evolutionary set theory, the individuals of a population are distributed over
sets. Individuals interact with others who are in the same set. If two individuals share
several sets they interact several times. The interactions lead to payoﬀ in terms of an
evolutionary game. Strategies and set memberships of successful individuals are imitated.
There is a strategy mutation rate and a set mutation rate. The population structure
becomes eﬀectively well-mixed if the set mutation rate is too low or too high. There is an
intermediate set mutation rate which maximizes the clustering of individuals according to
strategies. Evolutionary set theory is a dynamical graph theory. The population structure
changes as a consequence of evolutionary updating.
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